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I. INTRODUCTION: “THE EARLIEST STAGE POSSIBLE”
In a 2006 speech, former Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty
said the following:
In the wake of September 11, this aggressive, proactive, and preventative
course is the only acceptable response from a department of government
charged with enforcing our laws and protecting the American people.
Awaiting an attack is not an option. That is why the Department of Justice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation’s security at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—
1
preventative—prosecutions.

Though the military’s counterterrorism tactics have dominated our
post-9/11 consciousness of counterterrorism, federal criminal investigation and law enforcement directed by the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) have
adapted and expanded in an attempt to prevent terrorism with “forward-leaning” strategies. Observers have advanced a few theories for
the accelerating shift to preventative policing and prosecutions: constitutional difficulties with military detention, most recently in Boume2
diene v. Bush, the irrelevance of immigration law enforcement to
“homegrown” terrorists; the increasing decentralization of the global
jihadist movement; and the prevalence of “unaffiliated” terrorists op-
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School, J.D. 2008; Harvard College, A.B. 2003. Many thanks to my family for their support, Professors Harold Edgar and Daniel Richman for their invaluable suggestions and
insight, and the American Constitution Society, which made this publication possible.
Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty, Prepared Remarks at the American Enterprise
Institute (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/
dag_speech_060524.html.
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (declaring the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Military
Commissions Act an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and granting Guantanamo Bay detainees the right to challenge their detention in federal court).
In the first Guantanamo case to reach the merits, Judge Richard Leon of the District
Court for the District of Columbia subsequently ordered five of the six Bosnian-Algerian
petitioners released. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008).
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erating without any connection to a designated foreign terrorist or3
ganization (“FTO”).
Whatever the precise reasons, federal criminal prosecutions have
played an ever-expanding role in counterterrorism. According to the
New York University Law Center on Law and Security, between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2008, 228 persons have been
charged and prosecuted under a “terrorism statute,” with another
465 persons charged under other statutes but “publicly associated
4
with terrorism by the DOJ.” Of the 130 “Resolved Terrorism Trials”
out of 228 resolved or pending terrorism prosecutions, 93 persons
have been convicted; 12 have been acquitted; and 25 have seen a mis5
trial or dismissal. The other 465 defendants have been charged with
general criminal conspiracy, general fraud, immigration violations,
6
racketeering, and other offenses. Some scholars have noted that
pretextual charging has played a significant role in the government’s
7
early intervention strategy.
The Justice Department’s focus on early intervention tactics and
“anticipatory prosecution,” as Professor Robert Chesney has called it,

3

4

5
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7

See MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2008); see generally Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007) (describing several reasons
why the government has focused on intervening at early stages in terrorist plots).
NYU LAW CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: U.S. EDITION 2 (2008),
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/Sept08TTRCFinal1.pdf. The Center defines “terrorism” to include “the core terrorism statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Material
Support to Terrorists), 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization), 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (Terrorism Financing), 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (Financial Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization), and 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (Terrorism).” Id. at 2
n.2. The Center uses 18 U.S.C. § 2332 to encompass 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332 and 2332a
through 2332h, statutes “criminalizing acts of terrorism using specific weapons.” Id.
Id.; id. at 2 n.1 (“‘Prosecutions’ as used herein are counted per defendant. A proceeding
with three co-defendants, for example, counts as three prosecutions. If the same person
is prosecuted in two separate proceedings under two separate indictments, they are
counted separately.”).
Id. at 5.
See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 618–24 (2005) (describing the
government’s strategy, employed during organized crime and terrorism investigations, of
arresting suspects for lesser offenses in order to prevent the commission of more serious
crimes or to maximize the probability of a conviction). Richman and Stuntz also cite a
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) study surveying 288 convictions in 2002 which the
Justice Department had classified as terrorism-related. Id. at 620. According to the GAO,
at least 132 convictions were misclassified and the “overall accuracy of the remaining 156
convictions [was] questionable.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:
BETTER MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS NEEDED TO ENSURE
ACCURACY OF TERRORISM-RELATED STATISTICS 6 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d03266.pdf.
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under federal conspiracy statutes (18 U.S.C. § 956(a)–(b)) and material support statutes (18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B) has made undercover investigations followed by sting operations a more attractive
8
strategy. The FBI increasingly relies on confidential informants to
gather intelligence, conduct surveillance of mosques, and pursue
9
suspected terrorist plots. In several recent cases, including United
10
11
12
States v. Batiste, United States v. Hayat, United States v. Lakhani, and
13
United States v. Siraj, an undercover agent has “played a crucial cata-

8

Robert Chesney, Anticipatory Prosecution in Terrorism-Related Cases, in THE CHANGING ROLE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 157 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds.
2008); see also 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006) (making “conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure
persons or damage property in a foreign country” a federal crime if “any of the conspirators commits an act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the
conspiracy”); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (making it a federal crime to provide “material
support to terrorists”); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) (making it a federal crime to provide
“material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations”).
See, e.g., Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28,
2006, (Magazine), at 16 (describing the trial of a suspected terrorist and the key role an
informant played in his conviction); John Caher, Terrorism Trial of Muslims Raises Issues of
Entrapment, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 2006, at 1 (stating that an investigation of a suspected terrorist “began . . . when a Pakistani immigrant arrested on unrelated charges visited [the
suspect’s] pizza shop as a wired government agent”). Eric Lichtblau wrote:
In Albany, two leaders of a mosque are facing trial on charges that they helped
launder money as part of an F.B.I. undercover sting in a fictitious plot to acquire a
shoulder-fired missile for a New York City attack. In Manhattan, an undercover
operation helped the federal authorities in March break up what they described as
an international arms-smuggling ring that sold black-market assault rifles in the
United States and was plotting to import missiles from Eastern Europe.
In San Diego, two Pakistani men are awaiting sentencing and a third faces trial
on charges that they took part in what they thought was a Qaeda plot to trade
drugs for missiles . . . .
A number of other undercover operations are continuing, officials said, and
the Justice Department has committed more prosecutors and investigators to handle informants in terror cases and to initiate undercover operations.
Eric Lichtblau, Trying to Thwart Possible Terrorists Quickly, F.B.I. Agents Are Often Playing
Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at A10; Walter Pincus, FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2006, at A1 (“[C]ourt records released since then suggest that what
Gonzales described as a ‘deadly plot’ was virtually the pipe dream of a few men with almost no ability to pull it off on their own. The suspects have raised questions in court
about the FBI informants’ role in keeping the plan alive.”); William K. Rashbaum, Window Opens On City Tactics Among Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 29 (noting the
“depth of the [New York] Police Intelligence Division’s clandestine programs . . . to infiltrate mosques and Muslim gatherings around New York City”); see also Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (noting the dangers of governmental entrapment).
United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61186 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12,
2007).
United States v. Hayat, No. 2:05-cr-0240, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43737 (E.D. Ca. June 19,
2006).
480 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2007).
468 F. Supp. 2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
OF THE

9
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14

lytic role” in the criminal plot. Though some cases involve career
agents, many informants are often enlisted as part of a brokered deal
with the government to eliminate or reduce criminal penalties, drop
criminal charges, approve a political asylum application, or reverse a
15
removal order. This growing reliance on undercover cooperating
witnesses and sting operations for counterterrorism has dramatically
increased the risk of entrapment.
This Article seeks to reexamine the entrapment defense against
the rise of anticipatory terrorism prosecutions, and specifically, the
charging of material support in furtherance of a predicate offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. I argue that entrapment doctrine must be
restructured to keep FBI counterterrorism efforts targeted and focused and to safeguard innocent First Amendment activity from the
reach of highly inchoate offenses, which are aggressively pursued with
undercover informants.
II. THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND ANTICIPATORY PROSECUTION
A. The “Unwary Criminal” and the “Unwary Innocent”: A History of the
Entrapment Defense
The Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in
Sorrells v. United States and did so without grounding it in the Due
16
Process Clause or any other constitutional provision. Conceding
that “[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those en17
gaged in criminal enterprises,” the Court nevertheless barred prosecution of defendants for “a crime where the government officials are
18
the instigators of his conduct.” The dividing line between a legitimate sting operation and an impermissible “instigation” was unclear
when the defense was first established and remains so today. The
Court tried to establish boundaries for sting operations, arguing that
the government exceeds its police powers when it “implant[s] in the
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce[s] its commission in order that . . . [it] may prose-

14
15

16
17
18

Aziz Huq, The New Counterterrorism: Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in LIBERTY
UNDER ATTACK 167, 173 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007).
See id. at 173–74, in LIBERTY UNDER ATTACK 167, 173 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr.
eds., 2007); Caher, supra note 9; Lee Romney, Pressured to Name Names, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2006, at A1 (discussing the government’s use of minor immigration violations as leverage
in recruiting informants).
287 U.S. 435 (1932).
Id. at 441.
Id. at 452.
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19

cute.” The entrapment defense authorized an inquiry into the defendant’s predisposition largely forbidden by federal and state rules
20
of evidence. However, the Court did insist on restricting the inquiry
into the defendant’s predisposition to prevent a fishing expedition
for a generalized propensity to commit crimes, demanding: “the issues raised and the evidence adduced must be pertinent to the controlling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged
offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own offi21
cials.” This suggests that the government may always rebut entrapment by demonstrating predisposition, but that predisposition evidence must be tailored to the specific offense at issue.
After Sorrells, the Court revisited entrapment in Sherman v. United
States to apply a perhaps more restrictive standard: entrapment lies
when “the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party
and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would
22
not have attempted.” The critical distinction was between “the trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal,” language fundamentally in tension with the most fundamental of crimi23
nal law tenets, the act requirement. It is said that the defendant
puts his character in issue by claiming the defense, but it is worth noting that a jury, in rejecting entrapment, may ultimately convict the
defendant not only on evidence of the crime in question, but also on
an impermissible inference of guilt drawn from predisposition evi24
dence. Seeking to apply the vague standards of Sorrells and Sherman,
the federal courts generated a wide array of definitions and evidentiary standards. Scholars have identified and endlessly debated two
tests developed in the case law—the “subjective” and “objective”

19
20

21
22
23

24

Id. at 442.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . .”); People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 469 (N.Y. 1930) (stating that the government may not put forth evidence of defendant’s propensity of character when the defendant has not put character in issue).
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958).
Id. at 372; see also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (affirming a conviction that resulted from an undercover sting of an “unwary criminal,” in this case a methamphetamine producer).
Asserting the entrapment defense renders admissible certain character evidence that
might otherwise be barred due to prejudice under FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
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tests. The objective approach addresses the government’s conduct
and asks whether a reasonable person could have resisted the in26
ducement to commit the offense. The subjective approach, officially recognized as the test for entrapment in federal court in Hampton v. United States, focuses on the individualized predisposition of the
defendant to ascertain whether the government implanted the criminal intent and induced commission or whether the defendant, given
an opportunity, would have committed the crime independent of the
27
undercover activity. Today, the defendant’s predisposition to commit the charged offense is the governing standard for entrapment.
Two circuit courts have construed the subjective test to allow the government three related ways to rebut the entrapment defense by demonstrating:
(1) [A]n existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for
which the defendant is charged, (2) an already formed design on the
part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged, or (3) a
willingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by
28
the accused’s ready response to the inducement.

Some courts have also articulated a list of factors for consideration in
29
the predisposition inquiry.
The constitutional trouble that arises in the prosecution of inchoate terrorism-related offenses originates with this extension of judicial
inquiry into the counterfactual possibilities of what the defendant
might have done but for the agent’s conduct. When the act requirement is so diluted, the admitted predisposition evidence may improperly sway the jury’s decision and yield a conviction without the
requisite proof. That is why the courts have placed the burden of
persuasion on the prosecution after the defense meets its burden of
25

26
27
28
29

See Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 408–13
(1999) (arguing that the subjective and objective tests have non-existent practical differences); see also Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 151 (2008)
(explaining that the objective test is rooted in the Due Process Clause). See generally PAUL
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (3d ed. 2002) (providing an overview of the defense,
including the tension between the objective and subjective tests).
See Allen, supra note 25, at 411.
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976).
United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 945 (3d Cir. 1986)).
See, for example, United States v. Fedroff for a list of factors:
[1] the character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior criminal record; [2] whether the suggestion of the criminal activity was initially made by the
Government; [3] whether the defendant was engaged in the criminal activity for
profit; [4] whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit the offense,
overcome only by repeated Government inducement or persuasion; and [5] the
nature of the inducement or persuasion supplied by the Government.
874 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1989).
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30

production. In Jacobson v. United States, the Government failed to
meet its burden to overcome the defense’s evidence that it had targeted the accused with two and a half years of mailings and communications from fabricated organizations attempting to persuade the
31
defendant that the First Amendment protected child pornography.
While the Court did note the Government’s efforts to mislead the defendant as to the legality of child pornography, it did not explicitly
32
incorporate this into the test for entrapment. This suggests that an
element of misdirection as to lawfulness should be persuasive, but not
dispositive, evidence of entrapment.
There is a line of cases which further complicates the definition of
the defense. In the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hollingsworth, Judge Posner implied that the ability to commit the crime
should play a role in a trial court’s determination on the issue of en33
trapment. Without expressly requiring an additional showing of defendant capability to commit the offense, Posner did, however, elaborate on the scope of predisposition, arguing that though “ability” can
usually be “presumed,” entrapment should probably be found “when
the defendant is not in a position without the government’s help to
34
become involved in illegal activity.” Some courts have interpreted
this language to mean a defendant must possess both willingness and
35
“present means” for entrapment to be defeated. The Fifth Circuit has
explicitly adopted the “positional predisposition” test to supplement
the subjective predisposition test in United States v. Wise and United
36
States v. Reyes. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Thickstun rejected
30

31
32
33
34

35

36

See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992) (reversing a conviction for purchase of child pornography on entrapment grounds and placing the burden of persuasion squarely on the government to “prove beyond [a] reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by
Government agents,” the equivalent of the absence of entrapment).
Id. at 550.
Id. at 553–54.
27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. But see Lori J. Rankin, Case Note, Entrapment: A Defense for the Willing, yet Unready,
Criminal?, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1487, 1507–15 (1995) (critiquing the majority in Hollingsworth, arguing that the majority erroneously interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Jacobson); Elliot Rothstein, Note, United States v. Hollingsworth, 17 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 303, 304 (1995) (asserting that the court in Hollingsworth incorrectly interpreted Jacobson and that “readiness” should not be considered a distinct factor).
Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202. Judge Posner explicitly stated that “lack of present means”
was insufficient for entrapment to lie, but suggested it should be persuasive evidence. Id.
See also United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 739 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wise,
221 F.3d 140, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2000).
Reyes, 239 F.3d at 742; Wise, 221 F.3d at 155. Despite this seemingly pro-defendant expansion of the test, both cases affirmed the lower courts’ convictions. Reyes, 239 F.3d at 746;
Wise, 221 F.3d at 158.
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37

this view. The circuit split remains unresolved, but the weight of
opinion seems to side with the rejection of a capacity or “present
means” test.
B. Anticipatory Prosecution for Material Support to Terrorism Under 18
U.S.C. § 2339A and Entrapment Reconsidered
The prosecution of inchoate terrorism-related offenses has highlighted the dramatic risk of entrapment in undercover operations,
which lure defendants into conduct sufficient for an early arrest and
conviction. Professor Robert Chesney has explored the prosecution
of “unaffiliated” terrorism and the inchoate offenses the government
38
increasingly charges. Chesney has identified two statutes that the
Government uses in anticipatory prosecution of terrorists unaffiliated
with any FTO: conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a) and material support charges under the lesser-known 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
Section 956(a) criminalizes:
[Conspiracies] to commit at any place outside the United States an act
that would constitute the offense of murder, kidnapping, or maiming if
committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States . . . if any of the conspirators commits an act within the ju39
risdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy.

Since indictments under § 956(a) read FTOs and the global jihadist
movement itself as unitary, ongoing conspiracies, § 956(a) has allowed prosecution for mere membership and other acts in furtherance of an FTO or the global jihadist movement writ large without
connecting the defendant’s actions to a specific plot to commit a spe40
41
cific offense. The recently enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339D, which cri-

37
38
39
40

41

110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997).
Chesney, supra note 3.
18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) (2006).
For instance, United States v. bin Laden (see Ninth Superseding Indictment, 98-cv-1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), available at http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/binLadenetals298cr1023.pdf.) was uncontroversial as it identified a specific plot, but United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), characterized the Egyptian Islamic Group
(EIG), an FTO, as a “single, ongoing conspiracy” to kill, maim, or kidnap under § 956(a),
and any involvement in it would render the defendant a co-conspirator. Chesney, supra
note 3, at 466–69.
§ 2339D makes an offense to “receiv[e] military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization”:
(a) OFFENSE.—Whoever knowingly receives military-type training from or on
behalf of any organization designated at the time of the training by the Secretary
of State under section 219(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a foreign terrorist organization shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for ten
years, or both. To violate this subsection, a person must have knowledge that the
organization is a designated terrorist organization . . ., that the organization has
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minalizes unlicensed military-type training abroad, can achieve many
of the same goals (if a specific FTO runs a training camp), though
42
proving a violation is perhaps more difficult. While § 956(a) has
surely expanded prosecutorial capabilities, it is most potent when
charged as a § 2339A predicate offense. This Article therefore concentrates on § 2339A’s interaction with undercover investigations.
Section 2339A does not restrict the class of material support re43
cipients to FTOs. Instead, it prohibits providing “[m]aterial support
or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” one of forty-seven predicate offenses,
thirty-five of which are conspiracy-capable (§ 956(a) is among
44
them). Material support or resources is defined to include:
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious mate45
rials.

Since there is no restriction to FTOs, § 2339A is frequently charged
46
in unaffiliated terrorism prosecutions.
Prosecutors have charged
this offense in novel ways to push the outer limits of inchoate crimi47
nal liability.
Several factors make the statute particularly effective as an early
prevention measure and therefore more vulnerable to manipulation
in anticipatory prosecution on the fringes of criminal liability: (1)
the predicate offense need not be committed, nor even attempted;
(2) no agreement is necessary for an underlying conspiracy, so material support liability can attach before a conspiracy even forms; (3)
the support may be in furtherance of completed crimes or of other
preparatory acts; and (4) the statute’s conspiracy-capable predicate

42

43
44

45
46
47

engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . ., or that the organization has engaged
or engages in terrorism . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006).
The provision was enacted as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
(IRTPA) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3761 (2004). As of September
11, 2008, there were no prosecutions publicly announced as terrorism cases under this
statute. NYU LAW CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., supra note 4, at 2 n.2.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
Id. Of the forty-six predicate offenses enumerated at the time, Chesney’s tabulation for
prosecutions between 2001 and 2004 shows that § 956 was charged in twenty-seven
counts. Chesney, supra note 3, at 476–77.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006).
Chesney, supra note 3, at 474.
Id. at 479.
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offenses essentially criminalize “aiding-and-abetting a conspiracy.”
One other aspect that broadens the scope of liability is the expansive
definition of “material support,” which defines the provision of “personnel” in subsection (b)(1) as “1 or more individuals who may be or
49
include oneself.” The combination of these factors permits federal
prosecutors to seek conviction for the earliest stage of liability currently allowable under federal criminal law.
Chesney identifies three categories in the cases, which vary in the
nexus between a defendant’s actual intentions and actions and the
50
underlying predicate offense. Notably, even in the uncontroversial
“close-nexus” category, a jury acquitted defendant Gale Nettles on the
§ 2339A count due to possible discomfort with the sting operation
(Nettles had sold ammonium nitrate to a government informant posing as a terrorist representative), while still convicting Nettles on
51
counterfeiting and explosives charges. A notion akin to entrapment
may have informed the jury’s decision to acquit even when the defendant’s conduct was not particularly inchoate.
The “intermediate-nexus” category encompasses “overlap” cases in
which § 956(a) likely could have constituted independent grounds
for the material support conviction or cases in which conspiracy will
be unavailable to prosecutors, and § 2339A is the only remaining alternative. Chesney writes that if “the circumstances are such that the
only available inchoate crime charge would involve attempt rather
than conspiracy, the relative need for the § 2339A charge is much
52
higher.” Since a conspiracy cannot be formed with a government
agent who does not have an actual criminal intent and attempt would
have been difficult to prove at trial, § 2339A was the only realistic
53
charge available to the government in United States v. Lakhani.
The “open nexus” scenario illustrates how § 2339A and § 956(a)
have been charged in tandem to establish liability at a pre-conspiracy
stage capturing preparatory, and in certain cases equivocal, conduct.
The U.S. Attorney will charge § 956(a) or another conspiracy-capable

48
49
50
51
52

53

Id. at 479–80.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006).
Chesney, supra note 3, at 480–86.
United States v. Nettles, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1086 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Chesney, supra note
3, at 481–82.
Chesney, supra note 3 at 482. United States v. Babar, in which the procurement of bombmaking materials at a training camp in Pakistan could have been viewed as either conspiracy or material support, is arguably a case of the former, whereas United States v. Lakhani, a sting operation concerning a surface-to-air missile purchase, is arguably a case of
the latter. Id. at 482–83.
Id. at 484.
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crime as the predicate offense for § 2339A, criminalizing the prepara54
tory steps to a conspiracy. Several cases have reached this new frontier of liability with forms of support including fundraising, recruiting, procuring equipment, creating a “support cell,” providing one’s
self as personnel, and establishing and running training camps, in
furtherance of no identifiable agreement to commit a specific of55
fense. These cases involve the criminalization of acts taken in preparation of a conspiracy. Whether an agreement to commit a specific
offense ever results is irrelevant to conviction under § 2339A. So long
as the defendant intended such preliminary support to facilitate the
formation of a conspiracy, he or she can be convicted under § 2339A.
Though stacked inchoate offenses are not unknown in federal
criminal law, the § 2339A–§ 956(a) charge is fairly radical. In Salinas
v. United States, Justice Kennedy applied settled rules of federal conspiracy law when he wrote:
A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to
commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense. . . . If conspirators have a plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide
sup56
port, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.
The hard question in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza57
tions (“RICO”) cases is whether the conspiracy reaches a peripheral
actor who only contributed minor support; the conspiracy itself, of
course, must actually exist. By contrast, in § 2339A cases, liability for
material support attaches whether or not an underlying conspiracy
ever materializes. While RICO conspiracy is uncomfortably expansive
in certain cases, it is not as problematic as allowing prosecutors to
contend that certain actions are in furtherance of an as yet unrealized
conspiracy, a specific meeting of the minds. Alternatively, one might
54
55

56
57

See id. at 484–85.
See United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (convicting defendant for
facilitating communications between Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and the Egyptian Islamic Group); Indictment, United States v. Abdi, No. 2:04-CR-88 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (indicting defendant on a § 2339A count, material support in furtherance of § 956(a) conspiracy by seeking jihadist military training in Africa and plotting bombing of mall);
Indictment, United States v. Mustafa, No. 04-CR-356 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (indicting London’s
famous jihadist cleric Abu Hamza for attempting to establish a training camp in Oregon
and facilitating attempts to reach camps in Afghanistan); Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. al-Hussayen, No. 3-CR-48 (D. Idaho 2003) (indicting for charges of
online activity and fundraising in support of jihadists in Israel, Chechnya, and elsewhere);
Indictment, United States v. Arnaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (indicting for financing various jihadist organizations through Arnaout’s charity, the Benevolence International Foundation).
522 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1997).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).
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argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)’s “pattern of racketeering” essentially
58
criminalizes an ongoing conspiracy. Application of § 1962(d) would
then criminalize conspiracy to form a racketeering conspiracy. Even
if this were an accurate portrayal of subsection (c), the underlying
conspiracy or “pattern of racketeering” must be actual under RICO,
59
not merely conjectural or aspirational as with § 2339A. Combined
with the government’s broad reading of “conspiracy” under § 956(a),
criminal liability is pushed to the earliest point now countenanced
under American law and dangerously close to the punishment of unpopular speech or thought. There is one case, however, that seems
60
to have transgressed that ultimate boundary, the act requirement.
When the government criminalizes such inchoate, equivocal acts,
the undercover informant is charged with an even more delicate task
of avoiding entrapment, while securing evidence of a crime. The earlier the intervention, the greater the risk of entrapment will be. Similarly, the more inchoate the offense charged, the greater the risk of
entrapment. There are two overlapping issues in these cases: (1) the
questionable fixity of intent in a defendant accused of inchoate
crimes (i.e., whether an inchoate, equivocal act would have led to a
completed crime); and (2) the possible implantation of criminal intent in a defendant who would not have completed an offense but for
the government’s inducement.

58
59

60

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
Federal District Judge Gerard Lynch has gone further to describe RICO as the criminalization of status: this is suggestive of how expansive or vague conspiracy offenses can run
afoul of the act requirement. Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,
Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 661–63 (1987); see also Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (holding that defendant may not be punished for his “status” as
an addict, lest the state violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; an act is required).
In United States v. Hayat, a young Pakistani-American, who had been encouraged by an
undercover informant to return to Pakistan and attend a militant training camp, was convicted under § 2339A on the thinnest of evidence: statements supportive of jihadists; a
scrapbook with similar articles; a prayer kept in a wallet that the jury found violent; a videotaped “confession” with ambiguous, noncommittal responses to agents who asked
leading questions about his time in Pakistan and suggested answers; and various taped
conversations, which according to the government, revealed the defendant’s willingness
to commit an act of terrorism. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hayat, No.
05-240 (E.D. Cal. 2005); see also Arax, supra note 9; Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, THE
ATL. MONTHLY, Oct. 2006, at 82. The real indeterminate question was whether Hayat intended to act on his training, if he had even acquired such in Pakistan (the evidence was
all circumstantial and inconclusive). Hayat was convicted of a violation of § 2339A with
the predicate offense of § 2332b (an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries).
Hayat, No. 05-240. As Professor Chesney describes it, this essentially constituted a conviction for “providing himself as ‘personnel’ in furtherance of his own potential violation of
§ 2332b in the future.” Chesney, supra note 3, at 491.
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According to the Attorney General’s Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, “[e]ntrapment occurs when the Government implants in the mind of a person who is not otherwise disposed to
commit the offense the disposition to commit the offense and then
61
induces the commission of that offense in order to prosecute.” The
Guidelines list a series of criteria for authorization of an undercover
sting operation which are somewhat more stringent than the case law,
including requirements that:
(4) . . . (i) There is reasonable indication that the subject is engaging,
has engaged, or is likely to engage in the illegal activity proposed or in
similar illegal conduct; or,
(ii) The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so that there
is reason to believe that any persons drawn to the opportunity, or
brought to it, are predisposed to engage in the contemplated illegal
62
conduct.

Informants, who are frequently pressured into the role and pushed to
63
secure results, may not realize how fine the line between artifice and
implantation is in the context of material support to terrorism. Their
superiors may also dispense with these vague standards designed to
avoid ensnaring the “unwary innocent.” The informant may even
willfully transgress the Guidelines in the hope of catching a “terrorist”
to secure the promised reward.
For § 2339A prosecutions, which criminalize fundraising, recruiting, procuring equipment, creating a “support cell,” providing one’s
self as personnel, and establishing and running training camps,
among other preparatory acts, an informant may more easily implant
a criminal disposition and elicit the act when there is such a tenuous
connection to the underlying predicate offense, which need not be
successful or even attempted. The line between permissible artifice
and impermissible inducement blurs for extremely inchoate crimes,
because it would be difficult for the government to set a trap without
simultaneously inducing the very criminality it intends to identify and
neutralize. Provision of one’s self as personnel and recruitment, as
activities preliminary to a still unrealized conspiracy, may be easily
and inadvertently induced by a government agent who believes he or
61

62
63

UNDERCOVER AND SENSITIVE OPERATIONS UNIT: ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON FBI
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/
undercover.htm#general.
Id.
One Moroccan informant was threatened with designation as a person “likely to engage
in terrorist activity,” if he did not work undercover for the state. Romney, supra note 15
(describing coercive tactics that government officials use to pressure immigrants to become informants).
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she is merely setting a trap for the “unwary criminal.” At the margins of criminal liability, giving a suspect the opportunity becomes
the equivalent of forcing the crime. For instance, an undercover informant could not likely use artifice to lure a willing criminal into attendance at a training camp without in part inducing that offense.
Stated another way, since entrapment is rebutted by establishing
the relevant predisposition, the Government might arrest and convict
persons based on their “predisposition” to be trained or recruited by
jihadists. A predisposition to commit such an inchoate (preconspiracy) offense could only be established by pointing to the defendant’s ideology and statements. And though § 2339A charges
65
have survived First Amendment challenges, no court has treated
these First Amendment issues in the context of an aggressive undercover investigation and sting operation.
Professor Bruce Hay has written of the “signaling” effect of sting
operations and the dangers of entrapment. He has argued that if the
unwary innocent may be as easily convinced to commit the act as the
unwary criminal, then the sting is not probative of criminality and
66
more likely to constitute entrapment. However, Hay, who characterizes sting operations as tests to separate potential from actual lawbreakers, seemingly misses the irony in the search for a preinducement criminal:
The background odds are derived from whatever information is
made available to the decision maker concerning the defendant’s likelihood
of being a criminal. It might be statements that the defendant makes to police or third parties, either before or after the sting. It might be earlier
arrests or convictions for similar offenses. It might be other evidence of
67
the defendant’s character or criminal propensities.

The predisposition inquiry is at base an adjudication of character, not
conduct. When the criminalized act is highly inchoate, commission
requires so little, and a predicate offense need not even be attempted, an undercover operation is far more likely to trigger commission by a person with no predisposition to commit the actual underlying crime.
If completion, attempt, or even an agreement to commit the underlying offenses were required by § 2339A, the risk of entrapment
would be substantially lower. But where the underlying offense is
64
65
66
67

Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
See United States v. Amawi, 545 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ohio 2008); United States v. Sattar,
314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387, 397–
401 (2005).
Id. at 405 (emphases added).
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committed in preparation for a conspiracy to commit a listed crime
or conspiracy itself under § 956(a), the risk of entrapment is decidedly more pronounced. Though the Government, in rebuttal, will
likely offer evidence of the defendant’s predisposition to furnish material support to the underlying conspiracy to commit an offense, the
remoteness of the defendant’s actions and intentions from any underlying prohibited conduct indicates prosecutors run a far higher
risk of convicting the “unwary innocent” whose conduct may well
have been within the law, widely despised but not illegal. With respect to § 2339A -- § 956(a) charges, “aiding-and-abetting a conspiracy” which may or may not materialize, the State may find itself
prosecuting the only “crimes” of which it has evidence: unpopular
speech and unpopular association. Speech, association, training, recruitment, and provision of one’s self to the jihadist movement with
no involvement in a conspiracy may all be evidence of a generalized
“dangerousness,” but not a crime. There is a defect in § 2339A that
undercover operations have exploited.
The risk of entrapping the innocent is particularly high when the
Government conceives of the plot and takes substantial steps to aid in
its commission, without waiting for the suspects to take the bait and
68
reveal themselves as “would-be violators of the law.” While most
§ 2339A cases arise from arrests that are the product of tips, surveillance, or other forms of detection, only a few cases have arisen from
aggressive, long-term undercover operations. In the next part, I analyze the fact patterns of four prominent cases that arose from such
circumstances.
III. CASE STUDIES IN ANTICIPATORY PROSECUTION AND THE LINE
SEPARATING PERMISSIBLE STINGS FROM ENTRAPMENT
A. United States v. Batiste
The most prominent ongoing case built on an undercover coun69
terterrorism operation is United States v. Batiste. In June 2006, the
FBI arrested a group of young Haitian-Americans (“the Liberty City
70
Seven”), five of whom were citizens, none of whom had ties to a ji-

68
69
70

Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
Indictment, United States v. Batiste et al., No. 06-20373 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/cts_batiste_indictment.pdf.
See Kirk Semple, U.S. Falters In Terror Case Against 7 In Miami, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at
A28.
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71

hadist group. They allegedly conspired to blow up federal buildings
72
in Miami and the Sears Tower in Chicago. The seven defendants
were indicted on four counts of § 2339A for providing material support and resources, including the provision of themselves as “personnel,” in preparation for the following predicate crimes: (1) agreeing
to work under al Qaeda’s “direction and control”; (2) provision of
personnel for the destruction or attempted destruction of buildings
and the attempt to conceal that support; and (3) levying war against
73
the U.S. government. None of the accused is Muslim; rather Batiste
had used the “embassy” for religious instruction, according to neighbors interviewed, in the Moorish Science Temple of America, a syn74
cretic religion which was founded in the early twentieth century.
The undercover agent submitted that Batiste had initially sought help
from terrorists to execute their plan through an acquaintance before
75
formally swearing allegiance to al Qaeda. The indictment alleges
that the undercover investigation was initiated after Batiste reached
out to a third party who informed the FBI of Batiste’s intentions to
76
secure jihadist support for his plans in the United States. The agent
stated that Batiste was “willing to work with al Qaeda to accomplish
the mission and wanted to travel with [the informant] overseas to
77
make appropriate connections.” The indictment states that Batiste
wanted to create an “Islamic Army” and contends that Batiste requested “radios, binoculars, bullet proof vests, firearms, vehicles, and
78
$50,000 cash” from the agent.
The defense disputed this account, arguing the informant provided the defendants with a list of necessary hardware for jihadists,
led them in an oath of allegiance to al Qaeda which was videotaped,
and even informed them that al Qaeda wanted to blow up an FBI
71
72

73

74

75

76
77
78

See Carol J. Williams & Richard B. Schmitt, FBI Says 7 Terror Suspects Were Mostly Talk, L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 2006, at A5.
See Vanessa Blum, 6 Held in Terror Case Denied Bail, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A21; Christopher Drew & Eric Lichtblau, Two Views of Terror Suspects: Die-Hards or Dupes, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2006, at A1; Pincus, supra note 9; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71.
Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 3, 9, 11. At the time bail was denied, a seventh defendant was detained in Atlanta. See Blum, supra note 72; Williams & Schmitt, supra note
71.
See Pincus, supra note 9; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71. The FBI later shifted them to
a warehouse so surveillance could proceed without agents being noticed. See Pincus, supra note 9.
See Blum, supra note 72; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71. The second and principal
informant was paid $17,000 and also received approval of his petition for political asylum.
See Pincus, supra note 9.
Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 4–5 .
Pincus, supra note 9 (alteration in original).
Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 4–5.
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79

building in Miami. Significantly, the informant told Batiste that a
televised bin Laden statement warning of a strike inside the United
80
States was a reference to his plot.
The Government informant was the group’s only link to a terrorist
81
organization. Batiste’s counsel emphasized that the FBI had unearthed “no evidence that his client had met with any real terrorist,
received e-mails or wire transfers from the Middle East, possessed any
82
al-Qaeda literature, or had even a picture of bin Laden.” In fact,
FBI Deputy Director John Pistole described the defendants as “more
aspirational than operational,” with no real capability of committing
83
the acts. In seven months of undercover surveillance, the group only received six pairs of boots and the use of a digital video camera
from the agent. The raid uncovered no weapons, and the authorities
84
refused to say what, if anything, had been seized. The prosecutor
did contend that Narseal Batiste, the group’s alleged leader, had
asked the FBI informant to provide the group with rockets and semi85
automatic rifles. According to the indictment, Batiste had also allegedly communicated his plans to the informant, stating he wanted
to “kill all the devils we can” in an attack that would “be just as good
86
or greater than 9/11.” Batiste, who claimed he wanted al Qaeda’s
training, invited the informant at one point to travel with him to Chicago to meet his “top two generals” for the plot, but the trip never

79

80
81

82
83

84
85
86

See Blum, supra note 72 (“[D]efense lawyers argued . . . that the government informant—
not their clients—drove the alleged plot.”); Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72 (stating that
a lawyer for one of the defendants believed the government informant had played a
“large role . . . in the case. In one tape, the informant recited what F.B.I. agents said was
an authentic Qaeda oath, while the seven men sat on a sofa and chairs in a warehouse
that the F.B.I. had wired with eavesdropping equipment. As the informant repeated the
words for a second time, each defendant stood and stated his name before they all said in
unison that they were committing themselves to the ‘path of jihad.’”); Williams &
Schmitt, supra note 71 (“[T]his case was developed exclusively through information provided by the undercover operative, a circumstance that could allow defense lawyers to argue entrapment.”).
Pincus, supra note 9.
See Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71 (noting that “the ‘Al Qaeda representative’ [the
suspects] were dealing with was an operative with the South Florida Joint Terrorism Task
Force”).
Pincus, supra note 9.
Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pincus, supra note 9 (“[C]ourt records released since then suggest that what Gonzales described as
a ‘deadly plot’ was virtually the pipe dream of a few men with almost no ability to pull it
off on their own.”).
See Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71.
Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72.
Indictment, Batiste, supra note 69, at 6; Williams & Schmitt, supra note 72.
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87

took place. Counsel for Batiste’s codefendants disputed that their
clients knew of Batiste’s intentions, but authorities countered that at
least two had confessed to knowledge of the Sears Tower plot. The
subordinates had elected to participate in the photographing and vi88
deotaping of target buildings in Miami.
The Government alleges the Sears Tower idea was Batiste’s alone,
but does not dispute that the informant suggested bombing the FBI
and other federal buildings in Miami and suggested four other cities
89
to add to the plot. Nor does it dispute that the informant supplied
the men with camera equipment and urged them to case the government buildings in Miami. Federal officials also did not dispute
that Batiste’s group had “no ability to carry out the proposed at90
tacks.” The prosecutor stated that the group ultimately disbanded
after a dispute with another Moorish leader from Chicago, Charles
James Stewart, also known as Sultan Khan Bey, with whom Batiste had
discussed the plot. Recorded conversations between the two leaders
revealed the pair smoking marijuana and talking about a “Moorish
91
nation” to come. Material support of terrorism does not appear to
have been central in their thoughts.
Then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated, “[t]hese men
were unable to advance their deadly plot beyond the initial planning
92
phase.” To Gonzales, the fact that the South Florida Joint Terrorism
Task Force informant was the group’s only link to al Qaeda did not
diminish their liability. Another senior DOJ official acknowledged
that the men had been arrested well before they acquired any capacity to pull off the crimes and even well before there was any clear idea
as to what the FBI had actually foiled, if anything, with the arrests:
“You may never know what you prevented,” he said, “but those may
93
be our greatest successes.” On December 13, 2007, one defendant
in the Batiste case was acquitted, and a mistrial was declared for the
94
six others. In April 2008, the retrial resulted in a second hung jury.
Nevertheless, prosecutors are seeking to convict the defendants for a

87
88
89
90
91

92
93
94

Pincus, supra note 9, at A6.
See Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72.
See Pincus, supra note 9.
Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72.
See Pincus, supra note 9. When he arrived in Miami on the FBI’s dollar, Stewart told Batiste that he wished to create a Moorish nation with his wife, whom he called Queen Zakiyaah, and a Moorish army. Id.
See Williams & Schmitt, supra note 71, (internal quotation marks omitted).
Drew & Lichtblau, supra note 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Semple, supra note 70.
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95

third time. The third trial began in February 2009 and resulted in
96
five convictions and one acquittal.
B. United States v. Hayat
Hamid Hayat, a twenty-three-year-old Pakistani-American citizen,
was convicted on one count of § 2339A for provision of “material
support and resources . . . [and] personnel in the form of his person”
in preparation for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332B (Acts of Terrorism
Transcending National Boundaries) and three counts of making false
statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001) for concealing “the fact that he had received jihadist training, and that he [had] return[ed] to the United
97
States for the purpose of waging jihad.” The evidence for the material support conviction was that Hayat had allegedly attended a jihadist training camp in Pakistan between the Fall of 2003 and the Fall
of 2004 and had returned to the United States with the “[i]ntent to
98
[w]age [j]ihad.” The government offered recorded “confessions” in
which the FBI elicited non-committal responses to leading questions.
It is unclear from the transcript whether Hayat fully understood the
questions or their import. The interrogation was so poorly crafted
and coercive that a veteran decorated FBI agent was ready to testify
99
for the defense when the trial judge denied him the opportunity.
An FBI agent admitted at one point during the trial that he had never
been able to conclusively establish that Hayat had attended a jihadist

95
96

97

98
99

See Editorial, A Trial Too Far, WASH. POST, May 2, 2008, at A20; Editorial, Give Up on “Liberty City Seven” Case, TAMPA TRIB., May 8, 2008, at 12.
See Carmen Gentile, U.S. Begins Third Effort to Convict 6 in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2009, at A19; Damien Cave and Carmen Gentile, Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears
Tower, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A19.
First Superseding Indictment at 2–4, United States v. Hayat, No. 05-240 (E.D. Cal. 2007),
available at http://www.milnet.com/terr-cases/Lodi-Five/1st-superceding-indictmenthayat-dist-court.pdf.
Id. at 3.
The following is an excerpt from the crucial “confession”:
“Targets in the U.S?” the agent asked again.
“You mean like buildings?”
“Yeah, buildings,” the agent nodded. “Sacramento or San Francisco?”
“I’ll say Los Angeles and San Francisco.”
“Financial, commercial?”
“I’ll say finance and things like that.”
“Hospitals?” the agent suggested.
“Maybe, I’m sure.”
“Who ran the camp?”
“Maybe my grandfather.”
“Al Qaeda? Al Qaeda runs?”
“I’ll say they run the camp. . . . Yeah, that’s what I’ll say.”
Arax, supra note 9 (omission in original).
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100

training camp in Pakistan.
The indictment stated that Hayat had
“among other things, received training in physical fitness, firearms,
101
Upon returning to the United States,
and means to wage jihad.”
Hayat’s plane was diverted to Narita, Japan, where in an interrogation
he denied (the Government said “concealed”) that he had attended a
102
jihadist training camp.
Naseem Khan, the undercover informant, had developed a close
relationship with the Hayat family, encouraging Hamid to speak
about his views on jihad, his scrapbook of jihadist clips, and his
grandfather’s alleged training camp in Pakistan. Hayat resisted his
suggestion that he join the movement:
“I’m going to fight jihad,” Khan declared. “You don’t believe, huh?”
“No man, these days there’s no use in doing that. Listen, these days we
103
can’t go into Afghanistan . . . . The American CIA is there.”

At other points during the four years Khan spent pushing Hayat,
Khan’s questions elicited different responses. In reference to the
murder of Daniel Pearl, an American reporter in Pakistan, Hayat
said, “I’m pleased about that. They cut him into pieces and sent him
back. That was a good job they did. Now they can’t send one Jewish
104
person to Pakistan.” But in response to Khan’s prodding to attend
a camp, he was non-committal: “I’m ready, I swear. My father tells
me, ‘Man, what a better task than this.’ But when does my mother
105
permit it?” It remains unclear why Hayat was not detained in Japan
and refused entry to the United States if he was such a security threat
106
and would only be arrested soon thereafter.
Significantly, a crucial piece of evidence at trial was a prayer Hayat
kept in his wallet, a tawiz, which suggested violent motives to jurors
107
unfamiliar with Islam. In fact, the tawiz was commonplace and most
frequently interpreted as a non-violent plea for protection against
108
enemies. That this piece of evidence was so central to the prosecu100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
First Superseding Indictment, Hayat, supra note 97, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Arax, supra note 9 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. (“Why, if . . . [Hayat] was such a threat to national security, did the FBI take him off
a ‘No Fly’ list and let him reenter the U.S.?”).
107 See Waldman, supra note 60.
108
Id. Some of the translations of the prayer include the following. The government’s expert witness testified that the prayer translated was: “Oh Allah, we place you at their
throats, and we seek refuge in you from their evil.” Arax, supra note 9. A book entitled
The Prophet’s Prayers translated it as: “Oh Allah, we pray that you put fear in the hearts of
our enemies and ask for your protection against their mischief.” See Waldman, supra note
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tion’s case demonstrates the paltriness of the evidence against Hayat.
The defendant’s motion for a retrial based on juror bias and miscon109
duct was denied in May 2007.
C. United States v. Lakhani
In New Jersey’s first post-9/11 terrorism case, British citizen Hemant Lakhani was convicted of material support under § 2339A: providing material support and resources preparatory to violations of
three predicate offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 32 (destruction of aircraft or
aircraft facilities), § 2332a (use of weapons of mass destruction) and
110
§ 2332b (acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries).
Lakhani stood accused of willfully and knowingly engaging in the
brokering of Russian portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles
111
(SAMs) without a license. A Pakistani-born undercover agent, Muhammad Habib Ur Rehman, who in approximately twenty months
had 150 conversations with Lakhani, represented himself as a buyer
for the Ogaden Liberation Front in Somalia interested in purchasing
112
anti-aircraft missiles. During this conversation, Lakhani also stated
that bin Laden had “straightened them all out” and “did a good
113
Lakhani produced an arms brochure and claimed that he
thing.”
had contacts inside a military production company. At a meeting in
New Jersey, Lakhani was informed that the missiles were to be used by
jihadists who wanted to target airliners on the anniversary of 9/11.
The agent stated “this is not a legal business,” and Lakhani acknowl114
edged this.
After allegedly discussing prior arms sales, Lakhani

109

110
111

112

113
114

60. The Muslim Students Association/University of Southern California hadith database
translates the prayer as: “O Allah, we make thee our shield against them, and take refuge
in Thee from their evils.” Id. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hamid Hayat
Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges (Sept. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html (citing only the translation of the government’s expert witness in Islamic law).
See Judge Rejects Retrial in Pakistan Training Case, REUTERS, May 17, 2007, http://
www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1743994020070518; see also Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Retrial, United States v. Hayat, No: 2:05-cr-240-GEB (E.D.
Cal. May 17, 2007), available at http://207.41.19.127/caed/DOCUMENTS
/Opinions/Burrell/05-240.2.pdf.
Superseding Indictment at 6–7, United States v. Lakhani, No. 03-880 (D.N.J. 2007).
See Man Guilty of Trying to Sell Missiles in Sting Operation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, at A11;
Ronald Smothers, Man Pleads Not Guilty in Plot to Sell Missiles for Terror Use, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2004, at B6.
See United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2007); Tareco Affidavit at 1,
United States v. Lakhani, No. 03-7106, (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2003); Robert Hanley, Jury Hears 2
Views of Man Accused in Missile Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at B5.
Tareco Affidavit, supra note 112, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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agreed to the deal. At another meeting, Lakhani inquired about the
planned terrorist strike, suggesting it was to “make one explo115
sion . . . to shake the economy.” Through intermediaries, Lakhani
secured payment from the cooperating witness to make the purchase
116
from Russia.
According to the indictment, Lakhani did manifest
117
some technical knowledge throughout. Not only was he a trader of
groceries, rice, textiles, and oil; he had also lawfully traded weap118
ons.
Finally, in July 2003, after the FBI money was wired, Lakhani and
the cooperating witness traveled to Moscow to finalize the transfer
with the suppliers, who were undercover Russian Federal Security
119
Service (FSB) agents also cooperating with the FBI.
Lakhani did
not recognize that the missile on display was a decoy; the FBI trans120
ferred the actual weapon to the United States by plane. In St. Petersburg, Lakhani discussed the possibility of purchasing an addi121
tional fifty SAMs and a multi-ton quantity of C-4 plastic explosive. A
bill of lading was produced to confirm authorization to pay $70,000
122
for the SAMs. Lakhani was finally arrested in Newark, after meeting
123
with the informant at a hotel overlooking the Newark airport.
Lakhani’s counsel argued that this supply-and-buy sting amounted
to an elaborate scheme to entrap the “unwary innocent,” who otherwise would not have had the intent or means to orchestrate the
124
deal. These sting operations raise questions about the defendant’s
predisposition, since undercover agents were on both sides of the exchange with the defendant ensnared as an unwitting mediator. The
defense ultimately failed to persuade the jury that the plot and intent
125
were implanted by the government.
In affirming the jury’s rejection of the entrapment defense, the Third Circuit found that Lakhani’s “ready response” was “amply demonstrated by his multiple,

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

124
125

Id. at 3 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 7.
Superseding Indictment, Lakhani, supra note 110, at 2–3.
United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2007).
Tareco Affidavit, supra note 112, at 7.
Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 177.
Tareco Affidavit, supra note 112, at 7.
Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 177.
Id. (“Lakhani remarked, ‘[I]f we strike fifty at one time, simultaneously, it will f— their
mother. . . . It will shake them.
Then they will run. . . . Strike simultaneously
at . . . whatever time you decide. All at once in different cities at the same time. . . . They
will think the war has started.’”) (omissions in original); Man Guilty of Trying to Sell Missiles
in Sting Operation, supra note 111.
Lichtblau, supra note 9.
Id.
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self-financed trips to the Ukraine in search of a missile.” Along with
his orchestration of the money laundering scheme and the fraudulent bill of lading, this established predisposition and the absence of
127
any “reluctance.” However, the court did reject the Government’s
assertion that it could establish predisposition based on a prior
course of criminal conduct, since none of the evidence proved Lak128
hani’s prior arms deals were unlawful.
D. United States v. Siraj
Shahawar Matin Siraj was indicted on one count of conspiracy to
use explosives to destroy a building or other real property (here, the
Herald Square subway station in New York), one count of plotting to
derail or disable a mass transportation vehicle, one count of conspiracy to place a destructive device upon or near a facility used for a
mass transportation vehicle, and one count of conspiracy to discharge
129
and detonate an explosive device in a public transportation system.
Though he was not charged with § 2339A, Siraj is included in this
part due to the FBI’s aggressive use of an undercover informant in
building the case. In a case that reveals “the depth of the Police Intelligence Division’s clandestine programs,” Siraj, a twenty-four-yearold Pakistani immigrant, frequently worshipped at the Islamic Society
of Bay Ridge in Brooklyn, a mosque that was tracked by no fewer than
130
three NYPD undercover agents.
Siraj’s trial was the first based on
131
an NYPD, not an FBI, investigation since 2001.
The defense contended that the division’s extensive monitoring of the Brooklyn Muslim community violated a 1985 consent decree, which restricted such
132
targeted surveillance of political and religious groups.
The two
government witnesses at trial, a fifty-year-old informant named Osama Eldawoody and an undercover officer, did not even know of each
other’s existence throughout the investigation. Eldawoody attended
575 prayer services at the Bay Ridge mosque and another mosque in
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 179–80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179 n.11.
Superseding Indictment at 1–3, United States v. Siraj, No. 05-104 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14,
2006).
Rashbaum, supra note 9.
Id.
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 787 F.2d 828 (2d
Cir. 1986) (establishing the Handschu consent decree); Rashbaum, supra note 9; see also
Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1213 n.43 (2004) (describing the Handschu litigation and noting
other lawsuits brought against police agencies).
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Staten Island over the course of thirteen months, supplying his supervising detective with intelligence twice daily for a grand total of
350 reports based on these visits to the mosque and the Islamic book133
store where Siraj worked.
NYPD documents refer to numbered
cases, such as M3 and M24, suggesting that the Intelligence Division’s
Terrorist Interdiction Unit may have had active investigations at that
134
time in at least two dozen mosques citywide.
The Egyptian nuclear-engineer-turned-undercover-informant had
recorded hours of conversations with Siraj, in which the defendant
135
described aspirations to blow up bridges and subway stations.
In
August 2004, Siraj and co-conspirator James Elshafay, who testified
against Siraj, inspected the subway station and drafted diagrams to fa136
137
cilitate bomb placement. Upon arrest, no explosives were found.
At trial, the defense counsel argued that Eldawoody had entrapped
Siraj, eliciting violent, anti-American, and anti-Semitic statements,
declarations of support for bin Laden, and comments on the IsraeliPalestinian crisis, by showing the young man photos of Abu Ghraib’s
torture victims, talking about the suffering of the Palestinians, and
promising that his superiors would supply the explosives for the
138
139
plot. The jury ultimately rejected the entrapment defense. However, while Siraj described a willingness to commit terrorist acts and
even boasted of past crimes, much of the predisposition evidence
140
constituted protected speech divorced from any conspiracy.
Though the admission of this evidence probably was not outcomedeterminative, constitutionally protected speech should not be invoked in the service of disproving entrapment, especially when equally probative evidence exists. Eldawoody testified that Siraj had stated
he hoped Al Qaeda would attack America again and that suicide
bombings were justified to avenge the deaths of family members. He
called bin Laden “a talented brother and a great planner” and said

133
134
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Rashbaum, supra note 9.
Id.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Shahawar Matin Siraj Sentenced to Thirty Years of
Imprisonment for Conspiring to Place Explosives at the 34th Street Subway Station in
New York (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/siraj_pr.pdf.
Id.
Id.
See Rashbaum, supra note 9; William K. Rashbaum, Closing Arguments in Trial Of Subway
Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at B3.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 135.
See United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that even
though Siraj’s statements “may be described as reflecting defendant’s political views,
those statements were properly admitted”).
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he hoped bin Laden “planned something big for America.”
However odious these assertions are to American jurors’ ears, they constitute protected speech and are not probative of a predisposition to
personally commit an act of terrorism. As a result of their extensive
surveillance, the Assistant US Attorneys had accumulated other evidence that suggested such a predisposition for Siraj to commit an act
142
of terrorism, not merely to support the acts of others. Siraj was sen143
tenced to thirty years in prison on January 8, 2007.
IV. UNAFFILIATED TERRORISM AND MATERIAL SUPPORT
RECONSIDERED: REVISING THE CRITERIA FOR PROVING AND DEFEATING
ENTRAPMENT IN TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS
A. The Federal Courts Must Redefine Entrapment in the Context of
Anticipatory Terrorism Prosecutions Under § 2339A and Require a
Revised Jury Instruction
The Batiste, Hayat, Lakhani, and Siraj cases all demonstrate the haziness of the distinction between permissible government artifice and
entrapment. The Siraj court stated that, in the context of the entrapment defense, “[i]nducement by the government includes ‘soliciting, proposing, initiating, broaching or suggesting the commission
144
of the offense charged.’”
But the complexity of sting operations
demands more nuanced guidance. The common threads in these
cases include: (1) FBI initiation of contact in all four cases (as distinguished from drug stings, in which the defendant may initiate the
contact and sale); (2) FBI provision of equipment or money in Lakhani and Batiste; (3) FBI incitement to participate in the global jihadist movement in Hayat, Batiste, and Siraj; (4) FBI contribution to
the criminal plot or complete design of the plot in all four cases; (5)
FBI encouragement against the defendant’s resistance, ambivalence,
uncertainty or rejection in Hayat; (6) FBI (and cooperating agents of
foreign governments) acting as both buyer and seller in a sting operation in Lakhani; and (7) FBI cultivation of a close relationship with
the defendant over the course of many months or years in order to
145
set a trap in Hayat and Siraj.
All of these actions are cause for

141
142
143
144
145

Rashbaum, supra note 138.
Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 135.
Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir.
2006)).
See supra Part III.
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heightened concern when the Government charges inchoate crimes
under a statute like § 2339A.
Several principles and proposals for guarding against entrapment
emerge from the case law. The definitional changes to entrapment
in § 2339A prosecutions should begin with requiring the Government
to offer evidence of the defendant’s initiation and initiative to execute the terrorist plot. If the FBI supplies the overwhelming majority
of material, plans, targets, and ideological fervor, the crime should be
deemed per se “implanted.”
Similarly, courts should instruct juries to be wary of the Government’s charges when the informant is the defendant’s only link to an
FTO or the global jihadist movement. In Batiste, the agent not only
created an opportunity for the would-be violators, but instigated and
secured jihadist loyalty from the defendants. A court should find it
difficult to conclude this investigation was not a naked attempt to
manufacture predisposition evidence for a vulnerable group that
perhaps shared violent aspirations but likely did not have the capability or initiative to commit an act of terrorism. In addition to the Attorney General’s Guidelines’ requirement of a reasonable expectation of precision in isolating unwary criminals, a good faith
requirement would ensure that undercover agents hew closely to the
mission of identifying criminals and restrain their complicity and orchestration to the essential core of the ploy.
The informant’s assistance in the plot must be narrowly tailored to
eliciting the criminal intent of the targets. The Supreme Court
would be wholly justified in mandating a form of heightened scrutiny
for government conduct in the context of inchoate terrorism-related
offenses, specifically § 2339A. A tiered system of scrutiny, in which
inchoate offenses merit a more robust review of entrapment than attempted or completed offenses, would protect defendants from impermissible implantation of criminal intent. Correspondingly, juries
should be instructed that the Government’s burden on rebuttal will
be more demanding for inchoate offenses. If, as in Lakhani and Batiste, the undercover agent has crafted an elaborate plot in order to
better situate the unwary innocent, the Government should not be
permitted to prosecute crimes it largely invented and set in motion
with meager participation from a vulnerable defendant. The defendant may very well have different intentions, such as persuading the
FBI to part with its money. This appears to be a highly probable ex-
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146

planation of the Batiste case. In comparison, the evidence hints that
Lakhani may well have had the requisite intent and predisposition to
further an act of terrorism, but the FBI’s heavy involvement in executing the arms transaction tainted the evidence against him.
Though Lakhani was clearly pleased with his work, had the FBI engaged in surveillance, without assisting quite as much in the procurement and transfer of the missile, it would have made for a sting
more probative of Lakhani’s actual wrongdoing.
In contrast to this call for heightened scrutiny in § 2339A cases,
Professor Dru Stevenson has argued that the predisposition test
should be “relaxed” by creating a rebuttable presumption of predis147
position whenever entrapment is claimed in a terrorism case.
Stevenson argues that this proposal is rooted in the unique features of
terrorism, as compared to the set of vice crimes in which the entrapment defense has its roots, namely: (1) the higher stakes of prevention; (2) the difficulty of detection and arrest; (3) the lack of compulsiveness and addiction, which leads to self-disclosure; (4) the heinous
nature of the offense suggesting that only those actually predisposed
would be caught in the sting; (5) the positive externalities of undercover operations in instilling mistrust and fear in terrorist organizations or cells and giving prosecutors more leverage to flip defendants
and thereby further the goal of prevention; and (6) the higher cost
and danger which function as independent regulation of undercover
terrorism investigations and the diminishing returns of applying en148
trapment.
Though this thesis would be compelling for cases involving actual
attempts, Stevenson inadequately justifies this burden-shifting in the
context of inchoate crimes like material support. His argument depends on the “heinous” nature of the crime (though many violent
crimes fit this imprecise label), as well as questionable assumptions
about the fixity of terrorism suspects’ ideology, intent, and ultimate
149
willingness to act.
In one part, Stevenson essentially argues entrapment is irrelevant in terrorism cases, because “a normal person
would be immune to inducements. We can infer predisposition
merely by the fact that the person agreed to engage in such a horri-

146
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The defense noted in opening arguments of the third trial that Batiste, a construction
worker and father of four, repeatedly asked about the promised money on their recordings. Miami Men Face Third Trial in Terror Plot, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29261709/ (last visited May 8, 2009).
Stevenson, supra note 25, at 133–48, 179–97.
Id.
Id. at 138, 179–97.
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ble act, and that other evidence of predisposition is unnecessary.”
However, the earlier the government intervenes, and the more inchoate the charges, the less plausible such an argument is. Given the
broad swath of ambiguous conduct swept in by § 2339A (which requires neither a formulated conspiracy to violate a predicate offense
nor a recipient FTO), including provision of one’s self as personnel,
it is not so clear that anyone caught in a material support sting would
have done the deed without the inducement.
In particular, heightened scrutiny of stings is necessary when the
government and its collaborators act as both buyer and seller in material support cases. To remedy this problem, federal courts should
adopt the rule set forth in State v. Overmann and State v. Johnson,
which categorically rejected the use of “take-back” drug stings to re151
veal criminal predisposition. Most courts reject the idea that these
stings betray pre-inducement criminality, since “the operation scarce152
ly signals . . . that the target would sell drugs on his own.”
Persistent and ultimately successful government persuasion to
commit a felony over demonstrable resistance, ambivalence, uncertainty or rejection on the part of the defendant should be an absolute
bar to prosecution. When an investigation requires years of undercover involvement, an appellate court should closely examine whether the defendant succumbed early in the process or only after inten153
sive, longstanding pressure.
Misrepresentation of the legality of the conduct should be another bar to prosecution. Jacobson did not explicitly incorporate this
into the definition of entrapment, but strongly suggested that gov154
ernment misrepresentation of the law should bar prosecution. This
is arguably already covered in the Attorney General’s Guidelines re-

150
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Id. at 144.
State v. Johnson, 268 N.W.2d 613, 615 (S.D. 1978); State v. Overmann, 220 N.W.2d 914,
917 (Iowa 1974).
Hay, supra note 66, at 410. With the exception of some courts that extend the subjective
approach to even these extreme practices, many hold for automatic acquittal for fear of a
higher rate of false positives with such tactics. Id. at 410–11.
This principle has been cited by courts and scholars alike. See Stevenson for a discussion
of this principle:
The predisposition inquiry also considers factors like the alacrity with which the
defendant embraced the undercover agent’s offer or inducement, the time or
number of attempts required to obtain the defendant’s participation, and the defendant’s subsequent resolve or hesitation in pursuing the criminal activity. The
cases also take note of who initiated the first contact, and if it was the government,
then what reasons the government had to initiate contact with this target.
Stevenson, supra note 25, at 137–38 (citing PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (3d
ed. 2002)).
Jacobson v. U.S., 503 U.S. 540, 553--54 (1992).
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quirement that “[t]he illegal nature of the activity is reasonably clear
155
to potential subjects.” However, those provisions do not confer en156
Since the Attorney General’s
forceable rights on defendants.
Guidelines are more restrictive than the case law, it is possible that
making the FBI’s own requirements legally binding will ensure that
the Government’s investigatory efforts do not squander resources.
However, most of the criteria do not sound in terms of reasonableness and arguably do not create judicially manageable standards.
Especially for § 2339A charges based on § 956(a) or other conspiracy-capable predicate offenses, there must be a more substantial
connection to a terrorist organization, an unaffiliated group of jihadists, or any terrorism-related conspiracy, than a single informant’s
cover story. In Batiste, which did not include an underlying § 956(a)
charge, the only preparatory acts were taping the buildings and providing one’s self as personnel. Arguably, the defendants could be
prosecuted under § 956(a) independently if they had agreed upon a
specific offense, but the FBI intervened before such a meeting of the
minds. But to the extent the government ever relies on § 2339A liability instead, the prosecution cannot be allowed to depend solely
on the false identity of an undercover agent. This proposed principle
is supported by the rule that a conspiracy cannot be formed between
two people if one is an undercover agent. If that presents a bar to actual conspiracy liability, what justification can there be for dismissing
its relevance in the context of pre-conspiracy material support liability? There must be an independent and adequate basis to establish
that the defendant knowingly or intentionally furthered a conspiracy
or other predicate offense.
For acts in furtherance of a conspiracy, it is hard to conceptualize
this pre-conspiracy liability as crime, due to the overlap with lawful
activity. Actions such as fundraising, recruiting, procuring equipment, creating a “support cell,” providing one’s self as personnel, and
establishing and running training camps, if proven, will usually suffice for conviction on a different charge, such as § 2339D (unlicensed
military-style training abroad).
Since an “aiding-and-abettingconspiracy” offense is quite vague and allows the prosecution to con-

155

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, supra note 61.

156

The “Section VII. Reservation” states explicitly that the guidelines are “solely for the purpose of internal DOJ guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied
upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in
any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.” Id.
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jure an as yet unrealized meeting of the minds, the courts should at
least strike § 956(a) from the list of predicate offenses in § 2339A.
Government incitement of religious or ideological fervor, be it to
attend a militant training camp or madrasa, or to take an oath of loyalty to al Qaeda, should be an absolute bar to prosecution. If the
Government cannot identify and reveal illegal activity without pressuring a target to accept that violence is his or her religious duty, it
should have no power to convict. This is primarily because the Government should have a disincentive to instigate the very criminal intent and ideological extremism that counterterrorism operations and
prosecutions seek to deter. Not only do these tactics run afoul of the
federal government’s strategic priorities, but arguably they also impermissibly entangle the government in matters of faith and free exercise. In Batiste, Siraj and Hayat, incitement could have been instrumental in solidifying both the defendant’s commitment to a
particular material support or conspiracy, and in generating evidence
of predisposition. It is likely that the FBI understands such tactics
verge on entrapment. However, the FBI probably gambles that if
enough unpopular speech or threats are elicited from the accused,
then the jury will find entrapment rebutted on predisposition
grounds, despite the fact that the defendant’s statements were, in
fact, post-inducement.
B. The Appellate Courts Must Bar Certain Categories of “Predisposition”
Evidence in the Government’s Rebuttal of Entrapment in Anticipatory
Terrorism Prosecutions
May the Government introduce protected speech, or associational
and religious expression to rebut entrapment? The district court in
Siraj defined predisposition strictly as the “state of mind of a defendant before government agents make any suggestion that he should commit a
157
crime.”
In one § 2339A case involving an undercover agent’s testimony, United States v. Nettles, the court listed factors for determining
“if a defendant was (or was not) predisposed to commit a crime,” including:
(1) [T]he defendant’s character or reputation; (2) whether law enforcement officers initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether
the defendant engaged in the criminal activity for profit; (4) whether defendant showed a reluctance to commit the offense that was overcome by

157

United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or per158
suasion offered by the government.

Though the courts in Hayat, Lakhani, Siraj, and Batiste all admitted
protected speech as predisposition evidence, there is arguably such a
high risk of prejudice to the defendant that this evidence cannot be
probative of whether the defendant would have committed the offense independent of government inducement. Inchoate offenses
particularly lend themselves to abuse in this sense, as the threshold
159
act requirement is so minimal.
Is speech or religious belief probative of a predisposition or willingness to actually commit a terrorism-related offense? In Hayat, the
160
court admitted the defendant’s praise of Daniel Pearl’s murderers.
In Siraj, the district court certainly believed such evidence was probative when it admitted defendant’s statements supporting violent, terrorist activities, statements supporting Osama bin Laden, statements
boasting of prior terrorist acts, statements supporting violence against
a religious or ethnic minority (in this case, Jews), statements outlining plots to bomb the subway station, statements conveying a desire
to blow up bridges and subway stations, books and videotapes advocating jihad, and videos of terrorist strikes and other attacks on civil161
ians that the narrator blames on Americans. These were all admitted to rebut the defendant’s claim that he never entertained such
violent criminal designs before meeting the informant, who “inflam[ed] him with political discussions on subjects such as the war in
162
Iraq and . . . pictures of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.”
Though
the court held that the First Amendment does not bar admission of
163
verbal support for jihadist activity as predisposition evidence, federal courts should revisit the answer to this question.
Limiting predisposition evidence to only that which betrays an in164
tent to engage in “imminent lawless action,” would sweep too
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United States v. Nettles, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
See generally Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with Fundamentalism,
37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005) (exploring the tension between prosecution of inchoate terrorism-related offenses and guarding protected speech and association, which are hallmark rights of democratic life, with particular attention to the distinction between supporting or joining an organization and furthering its unlawful purposes).
Arax, supra note 9.
See supra Part III.D.
Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
Id. at 419–20.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (invalidating an Ohio statute that
punished people who advocate violence as a means of political reform or who “‘justify’
the commission of violent acts ‘with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety
of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism,’” among other actions).
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broadly in excluding both statements of generalized support and
statements of intent to carry out acts of terrorism. A revised, slightly
narrower test would substantially contribute to the goal of protecting
unwary innocents from entrapment, while still preserving flexibility
for the Government to prove predisposition. Building on cases such
as Scales v. United States, which prohibited Smith Act prosecutions of
mere “expression[s] of sympathy with the alleged criminal enter165
prise,” the Court held in Brandenburg v. Ohio that the First Amendment will not allow the prosecution of “advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro166
duce such action.” Similarly, mere statements of sympathy or advocacy should not be admissible as predisposition evidence unless the
government can demonstrate that this speech constituted the announcement of a concrete plan, boasting of past terrorism-related of167
fenses, or incitement to “imminent” terrorism. Only the latter categories of content are relevant to whether the defendant would have
committed the crime in the absence of government inducement.
The optimal rule would be a compromise that preserves the Government’s access to verbalized intentions to commit acts of terrorism:
communications or statements that describe future or present plans
to commit violent terrorism-related crimes would be admissible, whereas political statements of support that do not contain elements of
incitement or revelations as to criminal plots would be inadmissible.
The Siraj court was therefore partly right and partly wrong. The sympathetic statements for al Qaeda, terrorist activity, and media advocating the same were not probative of the defendant’s predisposition to
commit a crime. Hamid Hayat’s support for the murderers of Daniel
Pearl was equally irrelevant to proving predisposition or the § 2339A
charge.
To protect First Amendment rights and guard against abusive
stings and entrapment, the courts should only admit evidence that is
probative of a readiness to engage in a violation of § 2339A and fur-
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Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961) (“[T]he statute is found to reach only
‘active’ members having also a guilty knowledge and intent . . . which therefore prevents a
conviction on what otherwise might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy
with the alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any significant action in its support or any commitment to undertake such action.”).
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
It should be noted that Congress has never enacted nor could it constitutionally enact a
law prohibiting the “glorification” of terrorism, as the amended British anti-terrorism law
of 2006 did. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf.
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ther the predicate offenses. Though these forms of evidence will not
always be separable—in which case the Government should win the
tie—the dangers posed by combining potential jury bias, preconspiracy preparatory offenses, and undercover agent pressure are
simply too significant to admit evidence that demonstrates generalized sympathy for jihadist activity, but not a willingness to personally
engage in that conduct. The court in Siraj erred in concluding that
in spite of the First Amendment, the fact that “defendant’s statements
contain political expression does not insulate defendant from their
use at trial,” since his statements also boasted of committing violent
168
acts, and regularly expressed support for terrorism.
Siraj was not a § 2339A case and, even still, the court ostensibly restricted the permissible forms of predisposition evidence to:
(1) [A]n existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for
which the defendant is charged; (2) an already formed design on the
part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged; or (3) a
willingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by
the accused’s ready response to the inducement. With respect to a defendant’s “ready response” to the inducement, a defendant is predisposed to commit a crime, if he is “ready and willing” without persuasion
to commit the crime charged and awaiting any propitious opportunity to
169
do so.

In Hayat, the danger of baseless conviction was realized. It is likely
that the jury would not have been persuaded of the defendant’s material support to himself to commit a further crime if his statements
had been excluded. Given the consequences of admitting such unpopular, but protected, speech, the court should rule it inadmissible
when the statements do not contain any information on probable
past or future plots.
C. There Are Inherent Defects in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A That Require
Amendment
Statutory amendment may ultimately be required to clarify the
scope of liability under § 2339A and the relation of inchoate terrorism-related offenses to entrapment.
First, § 2339A should be
amended to require that if the predicate offense is a conspiracy, then
the conspiracy must be formulated. Forcing the Government to defer arrests until the conspiracy is formed will not vastly increase the

168
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Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
Id. at 415 (citing United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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risk of a plot’s execution. Second, § 2339A and § 956(a) could expressly outline what acts must be the defendant’s alone and what acts
may permissibly be facilitated by an undercover agent. Considering
the equivocal nature of these preliminary, inchoate steps to commission and the wide latitude it confers on the prosecution, Congress
could more specifically restrict the scope of material support with an
agency restriction. The overlap with lawful speech and associational
activity strongly supports a call for clarification of which acts may be
committed or facilitated by the undercover agent in a sting.
D. Policy Reasons for Revising the Entrapment Defense
First, while the FBI, the NYPD Intelligence Division, and other investigative agencies will more frequently deploy undercover informants, and not just in a listening mode, they risk alienating the Muslim-American and immigrant communities that police and
undercover agents rely on for tips. It is no secret to these communities that undercover agents have infiltrated and monitored their religious and communal lives. Vigorously policing entrapment in the
context of inchoate terrorism-related offenses will reign in abusive
practices. While this will not assure Muslim Americans that they are
free from police surveillance, it will send signals that the government
disapproves of aggressively preying on disaffected, volatile youth and
unpopular, though protected, beliefs.
Second, creating a more robust entrapment defense will incentivize greater creativity amongst federal and local agents to devise traps
that will draw out the willing terrorist’s plot without implanting criminal intent in the minds of vulnerable innocents. It may also create
incentives to monitor suspects for a longer period of time before
turning to an informant or arresting a suspect. Choosing surveillance
over early intervention is always a risk, as the Department of Justice
would probably argue. A strong counterargument is that deferring
intervention in favor of persistent surveillance allows the police to
discover the full scope of a plot and the greatest number of partici171
pants.

170

171

The charging of § 956(a) and § 2339A together could very well be unconstitutional if the
Supreme Court ever considered that combination’s near-eradication of the act requirement.
Many analysts have said that London’s MI5 was able to make sweeping arrests in July 2006
to foil the British Airways plot because it had waited and watched suspects for nearly a
year. The investigation into the previous summer’s bus and underground bombings led
to the July 2006 arrests. See John Ward Anderson & Karen DeYoung, Britain Arrests 24
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A third reason for this adjustment concerns the FBI’s resources.
The FBI should embrace the revision of entrapment (in doctrine,
jury instructions and the Attorney General’s Guidelines) as an opportunity to direct finite resources with surgical precision toward pursuing unwary terrorists with live plots, not those who might succumb to
years of pressure and persuasion. If the FBI terrorism task forces aim
to identify all persons on U.S. soil who sympathize with al Qaeda and
test them to see if they will join a terrorist plot, they will inevitably fail
to identify an actual, materializing threat with this overbroad strategy.
But if the FBI aims to identify suspects with a plan in search of an opportunity, their conviction rates will almost definitely improve. In
this respect, federal material support statutes, freewheeling charging
under § 2339A, pretextual charging, and weak enforcement of the
entrapment prohibition are allowing investigations to become unfocused and incomplete. An investigation that can secure conviction or
removal quite readily with meager evidence is an investigation that
may stop short of discovering all of a suspect’s contacts and plans. It
is shortsighted to think that keeping entrapment ineffectual will
172
benefit law enforcement in the long run.
Fourth, in a similar vein, more stringent application of the entrapment defense should cause the FBI to rethink how it recruits undercover informants. Instead of leaving its most sensitive cases to coerced informants whose interests in the venture arise from the
potential for personal gain, not public duty, the FBI should only be
recruiting full-time undercover agents with relevant language skills
and background. Training agents to investigate crimes undercover
and lay traps for those suspected of a desire to personally engage in
an act of terrorism would likely reduce abusive practices that result in
the implantation of criminal intent. The current hired guns are not
formally associated with the FBI and probably harbor no sense of loyalty or duty to the criminal justice system that has essentially blackmailed them into this role. Eliminating this practice of recruitment
by coercion could ensure that the undercover operatives understand
the danger of entrapment, at least in a practical sense, and are
grounded in the institution’s goals and responsibilities. A higher
conviction rate could well be the result.

Suspected Conspirators, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at A1; Craig Whitlock & Dafna Linzer,
Tip Followed ‘05 Attacks on London Transit, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at A1.
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But cf. Stevenson, supra note 25, at 179–97 (arguing that a relaxed entrapment standard
would enhance the benefits of sting operations, which include a reduction in government
surveillance and its attendant risks to civil liberties, and the deterrence and weakening of
terrorist cells consumed by mistrust and fear due to the infiltration).
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Finally, revising entrapment in the context of inchoate terrorismrelated offenses is particularly necessary to safeguard the freedoms of
speech and association that American government officials swear to
uphold, no matter how unpopular. But the reason is not only constitutional; there is also a practical dimension. Speech, worship, and association are all outlets for strong personal emotions—if chilled or
blocked, some will inevitably interpret this as hostile to their identity
and turn to crimes of violence. Prosecutors need to ensure that their
charges of choice do not unconstitutionally infringe these protected
outlets. American values, the way Muslims inside and outside America perceive the U.S. government and police forces, and the ability of
agents to identify legitimate suspects depend on keeping these outlets
open. Balancing effective surveillance against the possibility of chilling speech, worship, and association is a delicate exercise. However,
the FBI and other investigative bodies have not fully grappled with
the negative consequences of unrestrained undercover infiltration.
This suggests that the FBI needs to reconsider how aggressively it uses
undercover sting operations and whether it is trapping a criminal or
implanting the very designs it seeks to prevent.

